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Abstract. The proliferation of occasionally Internet connectivity and accessibil-
ity has been accompanied by an increase in cyber-threats, including fraudulent 
communications. Fake computer updates, which attempt to persuade people to 
download malicious software by mimicking trusted brands and/or instilling ur-
gency, are one way in which fraudsters try to infiltrate systems. A recent study 
of young university students (M 18.52-years) found that when such pop-ups in-
terrupt a demanding cognitive task, participants spent little time viewing them 
and were more likely to miss suspicious cues and accept these updates com-
pared to when they were viewed without the pressure to resume a suspended 
task [1]. The aim of the current experiment was to test an older adult sample (N 
= 29, all >60 years) using the same paradigm. We predicted that they would be 
more susceptible to malevolent pop-ups [2]; trusting them more than younger 
adults (e.g., [3]), and would attempt to resume the interrupted task faster to limit 
forgetting of encoded items. Phase 1 involved serial recall memory trials inter-
rupted by genuine, mimicked, and low authority pop-ups. During phase 2, par-
ticipants rated messages with unlimited time and gave reasons for their deci-
sions. It was found that more than 70% of mimicked and low authority pop-ups 
were accepted in Phase 1 vs ~80% genuine pop-ups (and these were all approx-
imately 10% higher than [1]). This was likely due to a greater tendency to ig-
nore or miss suspicious content when performing under pressure, despite spend-
ing longer with messages and reporting high awareness of scam techniques than 
younger adults. Older adult participants were more suspicious during Phase 2 
performing comparably to the younger adults in [1]. Factors that may impact 
older adult decisions relating to fraudulent computer communications are dis-
cussed, as well as theoretical and practical implications. 
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1 Introduction 
The number of older adults using computers and the Internet for communication 
and entertainment is increasing [4, 5]. Whilst the rapid proliferation of Internet con-
nectivity and accessibility is associated with multiple benefits to both younger and 
older users, there have been alarming increases in cyber-threats across both popula-
tion sectors. For example, a recent report highlighted that up to 45% of consumers 
have been the victim of cyber-crime [6]. Online fraud and scams are a growing prob-
lem across society, with the general public increasingly exposed to fake websites, 
emails and computer updates [7]. These communications attempt to persuade people 
to click on malicious links, unknowingly download malware or provide personal in-
formation, often by masquerading as established institutions or brands and creating 
urgent scenarios designed to instill a sense of panic in recipients [8,9]. In addition to 
the potential financial and psychological costs of becoming a victim of fraud [10], 
such fake communications have the potential to significantly disrupt consumer trust 
and engagement in online activities and e-commerce [11]. Understanding what makes 
people susceptible to responding to fraudulent communications is, therefore, vital in 
order to identify how susceptibility can be effectively reduced. This is not only key to 
inform behavior change interventions and interface design recommendations for those 
accessing the Internet for work purposes, but also for individuals, including older 
adults, who are increasingly using the Internet for purposes such as socializing, pur-
chasing, and banking.  
Older adults have traditionally been considered to be particularly at risk of fraud 
victimization [12]. This victimization has been linked with situational factors, such as 
greater social isolation [13]. However, research has suggested that cognitive mecha-
nisms related to trust evaluations may also impact vulnerability, with older adults 
being more trusting of stimuli that contain cues which tend to provoke a higher degree 
of suspicion in younger adults; a finding reflected in differential neural activation [3]. 
Truth Default Theory [14] suggests that when evaluating communications, individuals 
default to considering communications to be trustworthy unless particular cues are 
identified that provoke suspicion. Thus, it is possible that in older adult populations, 
subtle suspicious cues within fraudulent communications may be less likely to trigger 
an evaluation away from the cognitive default of trusting information to be legitimate. 
Older adults have also been found to be more likely to report succumbing to Internet 
phishing scams than younger adults, with prior victimization not predicted by differ-
ences in executive functioning ability [2]. However, a recent study did not fully sup-
port these findings [15].  
It could be that susceptibility to phishing is in part determined by the setting. For 
example, when reviewing a pop-up as a single task, older adults may accurately iden-
tify malicious intent. However, in a situation where a task is already in progress, be-
ing interrupted by a pop-up may in-crease susceptibly to scams as these situations 
would increase cognitive load and tap into executive functions, which have been 
found to decline with age [16]. Indeed, studies have found that older adults show 
higher global cost in terms of task switching, that they perform less well in tasks of 
di-vided attention, and that their selective attention is particularly negatively affected 
by interference in challenging situations [17, 18]. Older adults perform less well in 
tasks of divided attention [18], and their selective attention is worse when faced with 
  
more challenging situations as they can be more proneness to interference effects 
[17]. Furthermore, older adults have also been shown to have greater difficulties in 
keeping track of multiple streams of information and this may manifest in prioritizing 
one stream and neglecting another [19, 20]. There is also evidence that older adults 
tend to focus on one task more and neglect the other [20]. Taken together, these find-
ings would suggest that situations with a high cognitive load may lead to less advan-
tageous decision making in older adults.  
In their consideration of susceptibility to phishing emails within the general public, 
[21, 22] suggest that whether suspicious cues are noticed within fraudulent communi-
cations depends on the depth of processing that an individual engages in. Individuals 
who engage in more automatic, heuristic forms of processing are considered to be 
more vulnerable to the influence techniques used within these messages (e.g., urgen-
cy, compliance with authority, avoidance of loss) and neglect other, more suspicious, 
aspects of the communication, such as authenticity cues (e.g., accurate sender ad-
dresses). These are core parameters of the recently developed Suspicion, Cognition, 
Automaticity Model (SCAM: [22]). It is possible that any increased trust of such 
communications in older adults, therefore, may be due to a greater reliance on heuris-
tic processing strategies that prioritize influence cues when making decisions. Alt-
hough it should be noted that reliance on less cognitively demanding strategies 
amongst some older adults’ may not always be negative, depending on the task, goal, 
and context; including time constraints [23].  
A recent study by [1] considered these theoretically driven mechanisms in relation 
to judgements of fraudulent computer updates, using a task interruption paradigm to 
examine the effects of cognitive pressure on decision processes amongst university 
students (M age 18.56-years). They compared three message types differing in author-
ity based upon the presence and/or accuracy of informational cues (e.g., spelling error, 
inaccurate website link, lacking a copyright symbol). Genuine authority messages 
were not affected by any of these issues, whereas mimicked authority messages con-
tained all three cues to potential malevolence. Low authority messages, contained no 
sender details, no reference to the application that seemingly required updating, and 
no website link. When younger adults were interrupted by such messages, whereby 
their ability to engage in more considered, systematic processing of message content 
is reduced, they were more likely to miss suspicious elements, assuming that messag-
es were genuine. This led to accepting almost as many mimicked as genuine authority 
messages and an alarming 56% of low authority messages. This might have been 
partly driven by the short amount of time participants took before making a response. 
This was approximately 5.5-seconds for both genuine and mimicked messages and 
only slightly higher for low authority messages (~6-seconds). As expected, serial 
recall memory was impaired in all conditions irrespective of message authority, alt-
hough was markedly worse following low versus genuine authority messages. In a 
follow-up phase, where participants viewed messages in isolation under no time pres-
sure, the percentage of low authority message accepts reduced to 27% and whilst 
there was an improvement for mimicked messages, 55% were still accepted.  
The extent that the above findings apply to other population sectors, such as older 
adults, is currently unknown. For instance, are older adults more vulnerable to heuris-
tic processes that scams rely on and therefore less likely to notice suspicious ele-
ments? Or, similar to younger adults, does this depend on the degree of cognitive 
  
resource that individuals have available to process information at the time and/or the 
amount of time they allocate to make a decision when needing to return to a suspend-
ed task? These are issues that we attempt to address within the current study as under-
standing them is vital to ensure that effective mitigations and interventions can be 
developed that enable all consumers to safely engage with online activities. 
 
The Current Study 
The paradigm used by [1] is applied to an older adult population. Specifically, a task 
interruption paradigm is used, whereby participants complete a demanding serial re-
call task and are interrupted during this task by computer updates of varying legitima-
cy purporting to require urgent action. Participants must respond to these interruptions 
before they are able to continue with the serial recall task. Participants then respond to 
the same update messages during a questionnaire phase, where there are no additional 
cognitive demands. This allows for a comparison of response judgements when recip-
ients are under differing degrees of cognitive pressure. As in [1], participants within 
the current study are also asked to elaborate reasons for their accept/decline decisions 
within the questionnaire phase.   
 
Main Hypotheses 
According to previous research, the presence of urgency and loss influence techniques 
within computer update messages, combined with the pressure of continuing with a 
suspended cognitively demanding primary task, should lead to participants failing to 
notice inconsistencies within messages and defaulting to a trusting stance [1, 14, 21, 
22]. When individuals are under less cognitive pressure, however, these inconsisten-
cies are more likely to be noticed and illegitimate messages declined. Thus the follow-
ing hypotheses can be made: 
 
If increased cognitive pressure makes older adults more susceptible to fraudulent 
messages due to a reliance on heuristic processing strategies, it is predicted that: 
H1a) There will be no difference in response choice between genuine and mimicked 
or low authority messages during the serial recall task, due to a failure to identify 
inconsistencies in message content. Specifically, the proportion of ‘message accepts’ 
will be the same in the mimicked and low authority conditions as in the genuine au-
thority condition.  
H1b) Conversely, when participants have unlimited time to inspect the content of 
messages, mimicked and low authority messages will be declined significantly more 
than genuine messages, due to the identification of inconsistencies provoking suspi-
cion regarding message legitimacy. 
H1c) There will be no difference in serial recall performance between genuine and 
mimicked or low authority message interruption conditions, due to all messages being 
processed to an equal extent (i.e., heuristically) and therefore having an equal impact 
on primary task resumption. Though, and related to H1a, post-interruption serial recall 
performance per se will be higher than in [1] because older adult participants will 
spend less time viewing all message types than the younger adults in [1] in order to 
resume the interrupted task promptly to limit the degree of forgetting of previously 
encoded items. 
 
  
2 Method 
Participants. Twenty-nine participants from a Bristol UK-based group database of 
self-reported, community dwelling healthy older adults (over the age of 60) were 
recruited to participate in an experimental task advertised as a multitasking study. The 
experiment was one of a battery of studies (counterbalanced) conducted as part of the 
BRACE 2017-18 funded project: Measuring executive functioning predictive of real 
world behaviors in older adults. Sixty-one participants completed the entire battery, 
although nine were excluded due to Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCa: [24]) 
scores of less than 26. The mean age was 68.73-years (SD = 4.42); and approximately 
2/3 of the sample were female. Exclusion criteria included a medical history of neuro-
logical or neuropsychiatric diagnosis or other medical issue (e.g., brain injury, sub-
stance abuse, visual/auditory deficits) that could impede or prevent the ability to com-
plete the battery of tests. 
Design. A repeated-measures design was adopted, whereby all participants completed 
the same computer task (phase 1) and post-task questionnaires (phase 2). Phase 1 
included 27 serial recall memory (SRM) trials, with nine interrupted by pre-designed 
computer updates that required an ‘accept’ or ‘decline’ response. Messages were one 
of three types: genuine authority, mimicked authority, or low authority (see Fig 1 for 
examples), and there were three instances of each. Further details are provided below. 
Dependent variables included the number of to-be-remembered (TBR) items recalled 
in the correct serial order (Max. nine per trial) and the proportion of genuine, mim-
icked and low authority interrupting messages accepted (Max. three per condition). 
  
Materials and Procedure. These largely followed [1]. Phase 1 involved participants 
completing 27 SRM trials whilst being periodically, although not continuously, inter-
rupted by computer update pop-up messages. For each trial, participants were pre-
sented with a string of nine letters and numbers in the center of the screen for 9-
seconds. This letter/number string then disappeared and following a 2-second reten-
tion interval was replaced with the words ‘enter code’ for 10-seonds. At this point 
participants were required to record as many numbers and letters that they could re-
member in the correct order. Each trial used a different number/letter string. Nine 
trials contained an interruption, consisting of system security-related update pop-up 
messages appearing in the center of the screen after the letter/number string had dis-
appeared but before the instruction to start recalling the string. This message remained 
on the screen until the participant chose to either accept it by pressing corresponding 
keys on the keyboard. Only after participants had responded could they continue with 
the suspended SRM trial. 
Computer update messages were the same as those used in [1], see Figure 1. This 
included three genuine authority update messages (i.e., contained specific details re-
lated to recognizable organizations or software manufacturers, such as accurate com-
puter programme references, presence of a copyright symbol and genuine website 
links), three mimicked authority update messages (i.e., contained the same level of 
detail but included a spelling error, an inaccurate website link and lacked a copyright 
symbol) and three low authority update messages (i.e., contained no details relating to 
the sender of the communication, such as organization’s or application’s, and no web-
  
site link). All of these updates required an urgent response to counter a purported 
threat, and focused on e.g., anti-virus, program critical fixes, or expiry of licenses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example genuine (top), mimicked (middle) and low (bottom) authority interrupting pop-
up messages. 
In phase 2, participants completed a computer-based questionnaire whereby they 
had unlimited time to re-evaluate each of the nine update messages and indicate 
whether they would ordinarily accept or decline them. Qualitative data was also col-
lected by asking participants to explain each rating decision. Finally, participants were 
asked a series of 7-point Likert-scale questions related to cyber security awareness, 
which included: ‘To what extent do you trust communications from your computer 
system, such as security updates, in general?’; ‘How confident are you in your ability 
to differentiate genuine communications from scam communications in daily life?’ 
and ‘How would you rate your awareness of the common techniques used in scams?’ 
In total, phase 2 took approximately 10 minutes. Participants were fully debriefed and 
given information on how to be more vigilant when dealing with online pop-up mes-
sages. 
3 Results and Discussion 
Scam Awareness, Trust, and Computer Usage 
Participants reported a relatively high level of awareness of techniques used by 
scammers (M = 5.07; SD = 1.56; Range 1-7), although self-reported confidence to 
identify a scam (M = 4.21; SD = 1.82; Range 1-6) and trust in computer communica-
tions (M = 4.52; SD = 1.72; Range 1-7) were rated lower. Participants also reported 
spending on average 5.03-hours on computers a week and 4.28-hours per-week using 
the Internet.  
  
Impact of Message Authority and Cognitive Complexity on Judgements 
The number of messages accepted during phase 1 SRM trials and the questionnaire 
phase 2 are shown in Table 1 (and compared with [1]). A 2 (phase: serial recall, ques-
tionnaire) x 3 (message authority: genuine, mimicked, low) factorial repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of phase, 
F(1, 28) = 22.57, MSE = 1.55, p < .001, with messages more likely to be accepted in 
phase 1 than 2. A significant main effect of message authority was also found, F(2, 
27) = 10.05, MSE = .335, p = .001, as well as a significant interaction, F(2, 27) = 
9.01, MSE = .205, p = .001. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that during the 
SRM phase, participants were more likely to accept genuine than mimicked authority 
messages (M Diff = .31, p = .005, CI = .104, .516), in partial contrast to H1a. Howev-
er, there were no significant differences in accept behavior across mimicked and low 
authority messages, or, low and genuine authority messages (all ps > .2), in line with 
H1a. Conversely, in the questionnaire phase, significant differences were found be-
tween all message types, with participants more likely to accept genuine messages 
than both mimicked (M Diff = .414, p = .02, CI = .069, .759) and low authority (M 
Diff = .759, p < .001, CI = .460, 1.058), and also mimicked than low authority mes-
sages (M Diff = .345, p = .016, CI = .071, .619), supporting H1b. 
 
Table 1. Mean number of messages accepted per authority condition (Max. 3) when presented 
during the SRM and questionnaire phases. Note. Compared to findings of [1]. 
 
Message  
Authority 
Current Study 
Phase 1 
Williams et al. 
(2017) Phase 1 
Current Study 
Phase 2 
Williams et al. 
(2017) Phase 2 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Low 2.34 .97 1.68 1.25 1.07 1.10 0.82 0.95 
Mimicked 2.17 1.14 1.89 1.23 1.41 1.09 1.65 1.04 
Genuine  2.48 .91 1.98 1.25 1.83 1.17 2.15 0.92 
 
 
Impact of Pop-Up Message Interruptions Varying in Authority on Serial 
Recall Memory Performance 
Serial recall memory performance was considered for all four conditions (no inter-
ruption, low authority interruption, mimicked authority interruption, and genuine 
authority interruption), see Figure 1. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of interruption authority, F(3,84) = 6.723, MSE = 1.03, p < .001, with 
higher SRM performance in the no interruption condition compared to all interruption 
conditions (ps < .02). However, there were no significant differences in SRM perfor-
mance between any of the pop-up message conditions (all ps > .1), supporting hy-
pothesis H1c. This potential lack of processing differences between malevolent and 
genuine pop-up messages was further supported by findings of another repeated 
measures ANOVA, with a Huynh-Feldt correction applied due to violation of spheric-
ity, which revealed no significant difference in participant response times (i.e., to 
select ‘accept’ or ‘decline’) across message type, F(1.44, 40.32) = 4.09, MSE = 8.96, 
p = .60: M GA response time = 10.45s; M MA response time = 10.92s; M LA re-
sponse time = 11.00s. Interestingly, all mean response times were approximately 5 
seconds longer than in the younger adult sample of [1], yet SRM performance post-
  
interruption was very comparable to that study (noting a marginally significant per-
formance decline following low vs genuine authority interruptions in [1]).  
 
 
Fig 1. Effect of interrupt message type on serial recall memory. Note. Error bars represent 
±standard error.   
 
In combination, these findings suggest that when operating under a higher degree of 
cognitive pressure, older adult participants may have relied on more heuristic pro-
cessing strategies linked to an inherent truth bias. However, participants did spend 
considerable time (relative to younger adults in [1]) with the messages onscreen be-
fore responding, which may have aided identification of inconsistencies for mimicked 
authority messages, and resulted in these messages being more likely to provoke sus-
picion [14, 22]. Conversely, low authority messages did not provoke suspicion when 
participants were operating under cognitive load, with such messages failing to con-
tain overt information that could be used to trigger suspicion processes [14]. This 
failure to identify subtler triggers of suspicion during the serial recall task could be 
linked to previous suggestions of diminished ‘gut responses’ to suspicious cues in 
older adults [3], resulting in a continued default to considering the message to be le-
gitimate.  
When participants had more cognitive resource available (phase 2), however, they 
were better able to differentiate between fraudulent and genuine messages, with low 
authority messages considered to be the most suspicious (being accepted only 36% of 
the time) followed by mimicked authority messages (accepted 47% of the time). It 
should however be considered that participants were also more suspicious of genuine 
authority messages in this condition (accepted 61% of the time compared to 83% of 
the time in the serial recall condition), thus showing a reduced truth bias overall when 
more systematic processing of message content was encouraged. 
 
Why Participants Chose to Accept or Decline Pop-Up Messages 
Open-ended responses regarding why participants chose to accept or decline particu-
lar updates were analyzed using thematic analysis. The most common themes reported 
as impacting decision-making reflected those identified in the young adult sample of 
[1], and included: 
  
• Reference to the influence techniques contained within the computer update messag-
es, such as relating to known programs and/or respected organizations (e.g., “[] runs 
my computer programs so I trust them”), perceiving the action as urgent and im-
portant to undertake immediately (“Anything that mentions online security and stabil-
ity immediately causes worry for me”) or avoiding some form of security threat or 
other negative impact of some form of functionality (e.g., “important that the comput-
er is protected”) 
• Reference to potential authenticity cues, such as spelling errors or inconsistencies, in 
raising suspicion (e.g., “Spelling mistake in [] suggests non-genuine source” and “No 
source quoted”) or in appearing legitimate (e.g., “The link verifies that it can be veri-
fied as genuine”). Alternatively, this could relate to more subjective judgements, such 
as a communication either ‘looking genuine’ (e.g., “Source of message looks convinc-
ing” and “Seems genuine”) or appearing to be ‘not right’ in some way (e.g., “Suspi-
cious that this is a fake message and that accept will result in malware” and “Don’t 
trust message”), with precise reasons for this not given.  
• Reference to either technical knowledge (e.g., “I prefer my own security measures to 
[]’s”) or an awareness of potential risks of online fraud (e.g., “Anyone can call them-
selves []” and “It may not be what it claims; perhaps a scam”). This awareness was 
also reflected in the use of alternative verification strategies, whereby further verifica-
tion or support would be sought if lacking technical knowledge (e.g., “Would check 
with the university IT Dept”, “Unsure, so would ask husband”, “I would have con-
firmed beforehand after getting support from the link” and “ask expert”).  
• Reference to routine behaviors, such as always declining certain types of update 
(e.g., “Wouldn’t accept anything as their security software screens everything” and “I 
would never accept a clean process from a pop-up”). 
4 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to the current study that warrant noting and future 
attention. First, the sample size (N = 29) was much lower than in [1] (N = 87). Whilst 
this would normally be respectable given the independent variables tested and with-
standing adequate power to detect medium to large effect sizes (f = .25-.4, [25]), there 
might possibly be greater cognitive ability differences within the older adult sample in 
relation to processes such as short-term memory and attention-inhibition. These fac-
tors have been measured as part of the larger study although have not yet been ana-
lyzed in relation to the current findings. For example, it could be the case that older 
adults with a higher verbal working memory span would feel less pressured to resume 
the primary task faster (and also respond to a pop-up message faster) than individuals 
with a lower span. Second, we noted early on that typically fewer (~41-78%) partici-
pants in our tested age range reported regularly using the Internet compared to the 
~99% of younger adults identified in previous work [5]. Thus older adults might be 
less familiar with Internet pop-ups than younger adults. This may have impacted the 
findings and in future should be considered as a possible co-variate. Third, and related 
to the last point, it may be the case that a greater number of older adults are less famil-
iar with the brand and company names used within genuine and mimicked messages 
(e.g. Adobe Flash Player, AVG Internet Security, Microsoft Visual Basic). Whilst this 
  
does not seem to be able to account for the differences between accept rates for genu-
ine versus mimicked authority messages (i.e., should be similar if brand/company 
familiarity was an issue), familiarity is a factor that should be controlled for in future 
studies. Fourth, participants were not using personal computers and instead used uni-
versity computers under controlled laboratory conditions. This could mean that the 
perceived consequences of accepting more messages, despite their authority, was not 
deemed critical to the participants (i.e., ‘what is the worst that can happen?’). Addi-
tionally, many may have perceived the university laboratory to be a safe and secure 
environment and felt that the computers would be protected against possible cyber 
threats and/or equipped to deal with any that get through. Either way, this means that 
the findings need to be treated with a degree of caution in terms of possible generali-
zability to personal computer usage situations. Fifth, our sample were predominantly 
high functioning and mostly well educated, and so perhaps atypical of a less self-
selecting sample. This could have been linked with them being more aware of online 
safety issues. Finally, whilst we can assume that older adult participants were engag-
ing in greater visual and possibly heuristic processing of pop-up messages during the 
10-11-seconds taken to make a response compared with the younger participants in 
[1] (who responded ~5-seconds faster), both studies are lacking eye movement, fixa-
tion, and pupilometry (e.g., pupil size variations) data. This is a factor that requires 
attention in future studies if firm conclusions are to be made about what participants 
are processing, when, for how long, and to what depth.  
5 Implications 
There are a number of implications of the current study findings that warrant future 
attention. A key and alarming finding is that despite our older adult sample accepting 
fewer mimicked than genuine authority messages under conditions of high cognitive 
(specifically memory) load, 72% of all mimicked authority messages were accepted 
when 100% should have been declined if cues to potential deception were detected 
and acted upon. Worse still, 78% of low authority messages (containing no sender 
details, application details, website links or other cues to authenticity, such as copy-
right symbols) were accepted. Like younger adults [1], albeit to a greater extent, older 
adults seem to demonstrate a very high degree of susceptibility to potentially malevo-
lent online pop-up messages masquerading as innocent and important computer up-
date messages. Thus, at least two implications follow. First, older (and younger) 
adults seem to require better training into techniques and strategies for determining 
the legitimacy of computer-based communications such as pop-up alerts. Such inter-
ventions could involve training to detect cues to potential malevolence and allowing a 
sufficient amount of practice delegated to learn the procedure(s). 
However, the scenarios we have tested involve responding to pop-up messages 
whilst a high cognitive load memory based task has been suspended. So benefits of 
such training may be minimal if people are determined to deal with pop-ups promptly 
and return to the primary task. One idea is to train individuals to decline pop-up type 
messages when they occur under such cognitively taxing circumstances to minimize 
the risk of making a costly mistake. However, this will not always be possible (e.g., in 
safety- and/or time- critical situations) and may result in compromising the smooth 
  
and efficient running of the computer and its applications. Therefore, and second, we 
advocate the development of interface design features that on one hand should support 
users to dedicate more cognitive effort to checking the integrity of update type mes-
sages (e.g., offer informative feedback, permit easy reversal of actions: e.g., [26]) 
whilst not compromising the performance of a primary task (e.g., include flexible 
time periods to re-inspect and respond to messages, user control and freedom with 
clearly marked exits such as a ‘not now’ option: e.g., [27]). In the case of older adults, 
there are a range of relevant interface design principles (e.g., [28, 29, 30]), including: 
avoid complex or long messages to avoid memory/information overload; clearly label 
items (especially those that are complex); use simple, minimal and intuitive steps in 
order to perform tasks; and, avoid using time pressure (e.g., perform x in 10-seconds, 
choose ‘yes’ or ‘no’). Each of these and numerous other interface design recommen-
dations, together with better training into techniques and strategies for determining the 
legitimacy of computer-based communications need careful consideration in the fu-
ture to minimize susceptibility to potentially malevolent online threats amongst both 
younger and perhaps more crucially older adult Internet user populations. 
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